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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. EQUITABLE DrviSION OF PROPERTY
The South Carolina Supreme Court has applied the loc-
trine of equitable division of property most recently in Simmons
v. Simmons.1 The doctrine provides that one spouse acquires a
special equity in property accumulated by the other during cov-
erture if he or she has made a material contribution to the other
spouse's acquisition of the property.2 The court first adopted the
1. - S.C. -, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980).
2. In Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978), the South Carolina
Supreme Court quoted the following formulation of the rule:
Where a wife has made a material contribution to the husband's acquisition of
property during coverture, she acquires a special equity in the property so ac-
cumulated which equity entitles her, on divorce, to an award in satisfaction
thereof; and it is not a necessary prerequisite that the wife show that she has
contributed by funds or efforts to the acquiring of the specific property
awarded to her, but division may be had even though the wife has not contrib-
uted funds or efforts to the acquisition of the specific property awarded to her.
Id. at 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (quoting 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 293 (1959)). The court con-
cluded that Mrs. Wilson had "contributed materially to the financial success of her fam-
ily and the acquisition of property by her husband" on the basis of her employment
outside the home and expenditure of her income for household expenses, which freed her
husband's money for investments. 270 S.C. at 222, 241 S.E.2d at 569. See Domestic Rela-
tions, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. RFv. 61, 67 (1979) for a discus-
sion of Wilson. The survey author noted that the court referred to authority without
discussion and cited C.J.S. but failed to discuss the parameters of "material contribu-
tion." Id.
Simmons offers scant help in this regard, because both parties agreed at the outset
that Mrs. Simmons had materially contributed to the family, and the court was not com-
pelled to decide this issue. The court did, however, list those activities that apparently
persuaded the parties that the wife's contribution was materiah
It is conceded that Mrs. Simmons materially contributed to the financial needs
and acquisitions of her husband. She worked nearly the entire thirty years of
the parties' marriage, raised two children, purchased the groceries and cloth-
ing, and acquired other property with her own earned funds which was later
sold and the proceeds deposited to the family's general coffers. The parties
shared joint checking and savings accounts as well.
S.C. at - n.1, 267 S.E.2d at 428 n.1. Although Wilson and Simmons coincide on at
least two points, the employment of the wife outside the home and her purchase of
household necessities with her own earned funds, the decisions do not set forth an expla-
nation by which the outcome of cases not falling within either fact situation may be
determined.
The South Carolina Supreme Court is not alone in its failure to articulate specific
1
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doctrine in 19783 and subsequently has applied it in several
cases.4 In addition to reaffirming the doctrine in South Carolina,
the court in Simmons held that an adulterous spouse is not
barred from receiving an equitable interest in property acquired
by the other spouse during coverture if he or she is otherwise
entitled to it 5 but declared that the trial court may take adultery
standards: in deciding if a spouse has made a material contribution, other courts have
relied on a case by case approach. In this resolution of a fundamentally imprecise prob-
lem, courts have enunciated standards requiring the performance of duties "other than
those as attach to [her] status as a wife," Wood v. Wood, 104 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1958), or
"above and beyond the performance of ordinary marital duties," e.g., Duncan v. Duncan,
379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980), a "substantial contribution" by the spouse seeking the equita-
ble distribution, Hogan v. Hogan, 58 IM. App. 3d 661, 374 N.E.2d 104 (1978), an "identi-
fiable contribution" by the wife to her husband's property accumulation, Bosch v. United
States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979), "material assistance," Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla.
1071, 138 So. 796 (1932), and actions promoting the "financial betterment" of the family,
e.g., Gerhardt v. Gerhardt, 18 IMI. App. 3d 658, 310 N.E.2d 224 (1974). Wives have re-
ceived interests in their husbands' property when they have worked in the family busi-
ness for little or no pay, Green v. Green, 228 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1969) and Leone v. Leone,
39 Ill. App. 3d 547, 350 N.E.2d 545 (1976), paid for household expenses, Pohren v.
Pohren, 40 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 353 N.E.2d 6 (1976), and managed family affairs with
"economy and frugality," e.g., 18 IM. App. 3d 658, 310 N.E.2d 224. Other courts have
limited the wide-ranging implications of the doctrine by holding that a wife cannot, upon
divorce, receive a special equity of every penny she spent on joint efforts, Zuidhof v.
Zuidhof, 242 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1971), that a financial contribution creates a prima facie
presumption of a gift, e.g., Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1971), and that
a wife's short-term employment outside the home and the existence of a joint checking
account will not establish the right to an equitable interest in the husband's property, 58
Ill. App. 3d 661, 374 N.E.2d 1040. In rejecting equitable interest claims, one court re-
ferred to the benefit the wife enjoyed by living in the marital home, Sharpe v. Sharpe,
267 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1972), while another court awarded a wife the dollar value of her
services to her husband's business rather than her equitable interest in the business,
Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380, 35 So. 2d 6 (1948).
Emerging from this collection of case law is the indication that formulation of hard
and fast rules that will fairly compensate spouses for their personal efforts exerted in the
course of their marriages may be impracticable. Decisions must be based on specific fac-
tual determinations if an equitable division is to be effected in any given case.
3. Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978). Prior to Wilson, the court
had considered the doctrine twice: acknowledging its existence without adopting it in
McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970), and referring to it but re-
fusing to apply it to the facts of the case in Morris v. Morris, 268 S.C. 104, 232 S.E.2d
326 (1977).
4. See Simmons v. Simmons, - S.C. -, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980); Poniatowski v.
Poniatowski, - S.C. -, 266 S.E.2d 787 (1980); Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253
S.E.2d 652 (1979).
5. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 429. Although the case concerns an adulterous wife
seeking an equitable share of her husband's property, the court's use of the gender-neu-
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into account in its determination of the amount of the award.6
Although at least thirty-seven states apply some form of equita-
ble division, South Carolina apparently is only the third state
to consider the narrower issue of the impact of adultery on a
spouse's right to seek an equitable division of property.8
A. Adultery and the Right to Seek Equitable Division
In Simmons, the husband sued for divorce on the ground of
adultery. The wife admitted adultery but claimed9 an equitable
share of the husband's property based on her material contribu-
tion to its acquisition. The trial court granted the relief sought
by the husband and awarded the wife an equitable interest in
the marital home and surrounding land to which Mr. Simmons
held legal title. On appeal, Mr. Simmons argued that an award
to an adulterous wife of an interest in her husband's property
"does violence to laws of this state wherein an adulterous spouse
by law is denied alimony." 10 The supreme court rejected this ar-
6. Id. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 429.
7. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the 50 States: An Overview as of 1978, 13 FAM. L.Q.
105 (1979).
8. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that matrimonial fault, meaning cause or
grounds for divorce, should not be one of the criteria taken into account in an equitable
'distribution of property, concluding that the concept of equitable distribution requires
that fault be excluded as a consideration. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d
478 (1974). The Florida Supreme Court, in Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796
(1932), held that a wife is not required to forfeit her equitable interest in her husband's
property by virtue of her adultery. See also Benson v. Benson, 102 So. 2d 748 (Fla.
1958); Foreman v. Foreman, 40 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1949); Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 151
Fla. 372, 11 So. 2d 322 (1942).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1979) empowers the family court to deter-
mine all legal and equitable rights of the parties to a divorce in the real and personal
property of the marriage "if requested by either party in the pleadings." Nevertheless,
the supreme court has demonstrated its willingness to make an equitable division of
property absent a request in the pleadings upon the failure of a property-owning spouse
to object to the introduction at trial of evidence of the other spouse's material contribu-
tion, concluding that any objection to the pleading defect was deemed waived. Poniatow-
ski v. Poniatowski, - S.C. at , 266 S.E.2d at 788 (1980). But see Ingram v. Ingram,
273 S.C. 107, 254 S.E.2d 681 (1979).
10. Brief of Appellant at 2. The law referred to is S.C. ConE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Supp.
1979), which provides:
In every judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony the court shall
make such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money of either
party or any allowance to be made to him or her and, if any, the security to be
given as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case may
be just. No alimony shall be granted an adulterous spouse. In any award of
3
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gument and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The court
first explained that because a special equitable interest is dis-
tinct from alimony,11 the statutory foreclosure of alimony based
on a spouse's adulterous conduct1 2 is not applicable to a special
equity award of property. Then the court determined that, in
the absence of relevant statutory guidance, the issue must be re-
solved on the equities and ruled that equity forbade disallow-
ance of Mrs. Simmons' claim.
To reach this result, the court relied on the rationale em-
ployed by the Florida Supreme Court in Heath v. Heath.1 8 In
that case, the Florida court, construing a Georgia statute barring
a grant of alimony to an adulterous wife, concluded that an eq-
uitable distribution of property did not fall within the statutory
prohibition, 4 and resolved the issue on the equities:
Whatever consequences the wife may be compelled under the
law to suffer for her marital derelictions by the severance of
the bonds of matrimony, she is not required to incur the for-
feiture of any of her already vested equitable property rights
acquired by her while the matrimonial barque was sailing on
smoother seas.15
Although an adulterous wife can be denied alimony, the court
reasoned, justice precludes forfeiture of her vested property
rights.
By protecting property rights of an adulterous spouse, the
permanent alimony the court shall have jurisdiction to order periodic pay-
ments or payment in a lump sum.
The court indicates that Mr. Simmons sought literal application of the alimony statute
to equitable distribution. Instead, he appears to have urged the court to recognize and
apply to equitable distribution policies analogous to those supporting the alimony stat-
ute, namely, discouraging adultery and recognizing fault as an important consideration
in South Carolina divorce litigation. Brief of Appellant at 3, 5. The court apparently
concluded that any inequity to the husband was outweighed by the inequity which would
result to the wife if her claim were disallowed, but it did not state this explicitly.
11. The court defined the special equitable interest as "a property right earned by
the industry and labor of the wife during marriage," - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 428
(citing 24 Am. JUR. 2D, Divorce and Separation § 928 (1967)), and characterized alimony
as "a substitute for the support normally arising from the marital relationship," - S.C.
at -, 267 S.E.2d at 428 (citing Powers v. Powers, 273 S.C. 51, 254 S.E.2d 289 (1979)).
12. The statutory provision is set out in note 10 supra.
13. 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932).
14. Id. at 1072, 138 So. at 797.
15. Id. (citations omitted). The South Carolina Supreme Court quoted this passage
in Simmons, - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 428.
[Vol. 33
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South Carolina and Florida courts granted equitable relief de-
spite the wrong done to the other spouse. The courts in both
Heath and Simmons noted with approval the denial of alimony
to an adulterous spouse,16 but neither court questioned the pro-
priety of allowing an adulterous spouse to come into a court of
equity asking for a share of the other spouse's property. The al-
lowance of such an award arguably runs contrary to the clean
hands doctrine.17 The husband in Simmons argued that the
court should consider the inequity done to him by his wife, and
asserted that she had not contributed to the home, but had de-
stroyed it. 18 Nevertheless, the court was willing to grant equita-
ble relief to the wife, as the Florida Supreme Court had done
under similar facts in Heath.
In justification of an equitable division award to a wife de-
spite her own misconduct, the Florida Supreme Court, in En-
gebretsen v. Engebretsen,9 discussed the equitable maxim "he
who seeks equity must do equity." The court determined that
equity required the husband to surrender to his wife possession
and control of a portion of his real and personal property and
observed that
[e]quity will not permit or allow [the husband] to retain the
fruits of the industry and labor of his wife over a period of ten
or twelve years on the theory that it is forfeited to him because
she is guilty of adultery. The [husband] while seeking equity
must do equity .... 20
This equitable maxim is firmly established in South Caro-
lina21 and is applicable to Simmons. The South Carolina Su-
16. 103 Fla. at 1072, 138 So. at 797; - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 428.
17. The clean hands doctrine provides that if a plaintiff comes into equity seeking
relief to which he or she is otherwise entitled, that relief must be denied if the plaintiff
has unclean hands. D. Donas, REMEDIES, § 2.4, at 46 (1973). This maxim has been ac-
cepted and applied by the South Carolina Supreme Court in equity cases. Miller v.
Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E.2d 119 (1954); Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C. 523,
23 S.E.2d 735 (1943); Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199 S.C. 5, 18 S.E.2d 584 (1942); Whit-
lock v. Creswell, 190 S.C. 314, 2 S.E.2d 838 (1939). Miller was a divorce case.
18. Brief of Appellant at 3, 5.
19. 151 Fla. 372, 11 So. 2d 322 (1942).
20. Id. at 380, 11 So. 2d at 329.
21. See Anderson v. Marion, 274 S.C. 40, 260 S.E.2d 715 (1979); Shumaker v. Shu-
maker, 234 S.C. 421, 108 S.E.2d 682 (1959); Anderson v. Purvis, 211 S.C. 255, 44 S.E.2d
611 (1947); Taff v. Smith, 114 S.C. 306, 103 S.E. 551 (1920); Mayfield v. British & Am.
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preme Court perhaps impliedly recognized its relevance when it
stated in Simmons that "[tlo wholly strip the spouse of this
earned property right in addition to denying him or her alimony
would be manifestly inequitable. ' '22
B. Adultery and the Amount of an Equitable Distribution
Award
After ruling in Simmons that an adulterous spouse cannot
be required to forfeit vested property rights upon divorce, the
court held that adultery can be considered by the trial court in
its determination of the amount of the special equitable interest
and observed that
[i]n making a division or distribution of property on granting a
divorce, the court may consider the cause for which the divorce
was granted and who was at fault, and, ordinarily, the circum-
stance of fault has persuasive force, but is not of itself control-
ling, and does not justify the imposition of a severe penalty in
the way of deprivation of property.2
22. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 429. The allowance of the adulterous spouse's
claim can also be justified by reasons that relate to the nature of an equitable distribu-
tion claim. See Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974), for an explana-
tion of why fault should not be considered in effecting an equitable distribution of prop-
erty. This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 31 & 32 infra.
Arguably, the clean hands doctrine is not applicable in the context of marriage be-
cause of the requirement that the plaintiff's conduct be at least part of the source of his
or her equitable claim: the plaintiff's hands must have been dirtied in acquiring the right
asserted. D. DoBBS, supra note 17. This concept is difficult to apply to a marriage, be-
cause there is no single transaction at issue as there is, for example, when the plaintiff
seeks specific performance of a contract, and the defendant alleges that the plaintiff
made misrepresentations in the negotiations. The South Carolina Supreme Court, how-
ever, has adopted a rather broad statement of the clean hands doctrine, holding that
"[e]quity will refuse to lend its aid to one who has been guilty of inequitable conduct in
the subject matter," Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199 S.C. at 22, 18 S.E.2d at 590, and that
the "rule must be understood to refer to some misconduct in regard to the matter in
litigation of which the opposite party can, in good conscience, complain in a court of
equity," Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C. at 532, 23 S.E.2d at 738 (referring to
American Ass'n v. Innis, 109 Ky. 595, 60 S.W. 388). Furthermore, the supreme court has
recognized the applicability of the clean hands doctrine in domestic cases and has held
that when a wife seeks alimony, "she must come with clean hands." Miller v. Miller, 225
S.C. 274, 82 S.E.2d 119 (1954).
23. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 429 (quoting 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 295(7) (1959)).
The cases cited as authority for the quoted principle apply it in a variety of situations,
including a division of community property when one spouse is at fault, Shapiro v. Sha-
piro, 127 Cal. App. 20, 14 P.2d 1058 (1954), a determination of the amount of alimony a
guilty party should pay, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956),
6
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The court concluded that the adultery of a spouse, while not
"such a persuasive factor as to justify the total divestment of her
equitable interest in the property, . . . is one of a panoply of
considerations for the family court in determining an equitable
division."2
One court, however, has ruled that matrimonial fault, de-
fined as "cause or grounds for divorce,"2 5 should not be consid-
ered when making an equitable distribution of property." The
New Jersey Supreme Court, in Chalmers v. Chalmers,2 7 noted
that the concept of fault is not relevant to an equitable distribu-
tion "since all that is being effected is the allocation to each
party of what really belongs to him or her. ' 28 The New Jersey
court also recognized the difficulty of determining which party
primarily is responsible for the failure of the marriage, regard-
less of who may be the defendant in the divorce proceeding.29
Given the difficulty of establishing actual fault, the court con-
cluded that fault should be ignored by the trial court when mak-
ing a division of property.
Although the New Jersey result may represent a more logi-
cal application of the equitable distribution doctrine, the Sim-
mons decision is more responsive to the concerns of the injured
party. Because the South Carolina Supreme Court based its de-
cision in Simmons on the inequity that would result from de-
priving Mrs. Simmons of property rights she had earned through
and determining the share of a husband's property to which a wronged wife is entitled
on divorce, Farrand v. Farrand, 26 Iowa 488, 67 N.W.2d 20 (1954); Waugh v. Waugh, 154
Neb. 325, 47 N.W.2d 859 (1951); Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1013 (1933). In
these cases, the major concern of the courts is equity. the primary goal is to effect a
division of property or an alimony arrangement that is fair in each particular case. One
court expressly held that whether the award to a wife is an "allowance" or an equitable
division is immaterial and stated that the court is not bound "by any mathematical
formula, but shall make such an award from the material factors before [it] having due
regard for equity and the circumstances of the parties." Kressly v. Kressly, 77 S.D. 143,
150, 87 N.W.2d 601, 605 (1958).
24. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 429.
25. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974).
26. Id.; Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974). Although the New
Jersey decisions discuss fault generally, the reasoning clearly is applicable to adultery, a
specific kind of fault. The court in Simmons cited a C.J.S. discussion of fault, not adul-
tery, to support its conclusion that adultery should be considered in determining the
amount of an equitable award. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 429.
27. 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974).
28. Id. at 194, 320 A.2d at 482.
29. Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482.
7
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her own efforts, it arguably is inconsistent for the court to allow
the trial judge to penalize her through an award that does not
reflect her true contributions to the acquisition of the property.
Yet, despite its refusal to deprive Mrs. Simmons of her special
equitable interest, the court was unwilling to establish a rule
that ignored her conduct and its negative impact on her hus-
band and family. The result strikes an effective compromise: one
spouse will not be deprived totally of property he or she helped
the other spouse accumulate, but the wronged party will not be
without any redress for the wrong he or she has suffered. By
leaving the determination of the amount of a spouse's special
equitable interest to "the sound discretion of the family
court,"30 the supreme court recognized that a fair result in any
given case depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding
the marriage and divorce.
C. The Tax Implications of Equitable Distribution
The adoption of equitable distribution in South Carolina
raises a substantial question regarding the federal income tax li-
ability of a spouse divested by an equitable division award. The
controlling statutes provide that gains from dealings in property
are to be taxed upon "the sale or disposition of the property.13 1
Whether the special equity award constitutes a "disposition"32
depends on a determination of the nature of one spouse's inter-
est in the property of the other spouse prior to divorce.33 The
South Carolina Supreme Court's observation in Simmons that a
wife is not required to forfeit her "already vested" property
rights by virtue of her adultery"M provides some guidance in this
area but may not be controlling.
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Da-
vis,3 5 ruled that a taxpayer-husband realized a taxable gain on
the transfer of appreciated property to his wife pursuant to a
negotiated property settlement.36 The Court looked to the law of
30. - S.C. at , 267 S.E.2d at 429.
31. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1001.
32. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 67 (1964).
33. Id. at 69.
34. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
35. 370 U.S. 65 (1964).
36. Id. at 66. The taxpayer argued that the transfer was a nontaxable division of
property between co-owners, while the government maintained that the transaction con-
[Vol. 33
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the state where the parties resided and were divorced to deter-
mine the rights of a wife in her husband's property prior to di-
vorce. The Court concluded that "the inchoate rights granted a
wife in her husband's property by the Delaware law do not even
remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. '3 7 Although Dela-
ware law provided that, upon divorce, a wife shared in her hus-
band's property to the extent deemed reasonable by the courtu
the Supreme Court found that this provision placed a burden on
the husband's property but did not make the wife a co-owner.3 9
Consequently, the taxpayer had not transferred to his wife prop-
erty in which she had a vested interest but had exchanged ap-
preciated property as consideration for the release of her marital
rights. The Court concluded that the taxpayer had realized a
taxable gain in the amount of the appreciation of the property.
40
After Davis, federal circuit courts faced with deciding
whether a transfer of property to an ex-spouse is a taxable event
have looked to state law to determine the parties' substantive
rights in the property. 1 If state law indicates that a wife is a co-
owner of her husband's property, then the transfer is considered
a nontaxable division of jointly owned property. 3 When the
wife's rights under state law are inchoate and inconsistent with
common ownership, the transfer is deemed a taxable event. 3
stituted a taxable transfer of property in exchange for the release of a legal obligation.
37. Id. at 70.
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1527(a)(3) (1974).
39. 370 U.S. at 70.
40. Id. at 74.
41. This is consistent with the statement of the Supreme Court in Davis that the
holding "may permit different tax treatment among the several States. . . ." Id. at 71.
42. See Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979); Imel v. United States,
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Swaim v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1969);
Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
43. See Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974); Wallace v. United
States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971). In Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.
1968), and Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals looked to state law in Colorado and Oklahoma, respectively, and con-
cluded that the rights of the wife in those states were similar to the inchoate rights of
the wife in Davis. Each court subsequently changed its opinion, however, when the state
supreme courts ruled that wives had a vested interest in their husband's property prior
to divorce. In re Questions Submitted by United States District Court for the District of
Colo., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974); Collins v. Okla. Tax Conm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla.
1968). After these state court decisions, the circuit court ruled in Imel, 523 F.2d 853, and
Collins, 412 F.2d 211, that the transfer was not a taxable event.
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Absent traditional elements of co-ownership, the circuit courts
have been inclined to rule that a property transfer upon divorce
is a taxable event." Indicia of common ownership may not be
necessary, however, when a state supreme court has held that a
wife has a vested interest in her husband's property prior to
divorce. 0
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on the
question, but the South Carolina Supreme Court's indication in
Simmons that a special equitable interest is a vested right may
be sufficient to lead the federal court to conclude that an equita-
ble division of property is a nontaxable event in South Carolina.
Interpreting identical language in a Florida case, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in Bosch v. United States,46 ruled that a
special equity award constituted a division of existing property
interests and thus was not a taxable event.47 The federal court's
reliance in Bosch on other Florida decisions dealing with the
doctrine of equitable distribution,48 however, coupled with South
Carolina's lack of a comparable decisional history, makes the
precedential value of Bosch uncertain. Furthermore, other cir-
cuit courts have rejected the reasoning used by the Fifth Circuit
Court in Bosch. 9 Until the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
inconsistent with common ownership are the absence of the right to control or affect the
disposition and management of the property, descendible interest, and a vested interest
in the property prior to divorce. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Collins v.
Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
44. See note 43 supra.
45. Id.
46. 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. Id. at 168. The court distinguished Davis on two grounds: in Davis, the wife
expressly had relinquished her marital rights, whereas in Bosch she had not, and Dela-
ware law did not recognize an interest similar to the "special equity" established by the
Florida cases. Id. Under Florida law, the court stated, the family court must grant the
special equity to the wife if she has made the requisite contribution. Id. (citing Dupree v.
Dupree, 156 Fla. 455, 23 So. 2d 554 (1945), in which the Florida Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the divorce court which had refused to grant an equitable award.)
Therefore, the rights of the wife are not inchoate, as in Delaware, but are vested prop-
erty rights that become identifiable upon termination of the marriage. 590 F.2d at 167.
48. Dupree v. Dupree, 156 Fla. 455, 23 So. 2d 554 (1945); Engebretsen v. Engebret-
sen, 151 Fla. 372, 11 So. 2d 322 (1942); Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87 (1919).
49. In Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), the court ruled that
because the traditional elements of co-ownership were lacking, the fact that the state
court spoke as if it were dividing common property did not prevent federal courts from
concluding that the division for tax purposes was in satisfaction of marital obligations.
This decision has been superseded. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969). In Wallace v. United
States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971), and Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.
10
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determined whether a special equity award is a taxable disposi-
tion of property in South Carolina, the spouse whose property is
divided must remain uncertain about his or her resulting tax
liability.
II. MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
Before a request for modification of child support payments
can be granted, the moving party must show that there has been
a change in circumstances that justifies the modification.50 In
Bryan v. Bryan,51 the South Carolina Supreme Court observed
that, ordinarily, a change in a divorced spouse's financial condi-
tion as a result of remarriage is not of itself ground for modifica-
tion of support payments for a child of a former marriage;
rather, a case by case determination must be made in the light
of individual facts and circumstances. On the facts before it, the
court held that the income of the new spouse should not be con-
sidered.2 This holding placed South Carolina within the minor-
ity of jurisdictions that have considered this issue. 3
In Bryan, a divorce decree awarded Mrs. Bryan alimony,
custody of the couple's two children, and child support. Mr.
Bryan subsequently remarried. His second wife was employed,
and her two children by a prior marriage received social security
payments. Claiming that his income had been reduced and that
he therefore was unable to maintain the child support payments
at their existing level, Mr. Bryan sought a reduction in the
amount of the payments." The trial judge determined that Mr.
Bryan had made his second wife's income relevant to the modifi-
cation action55 and considered her income in denying the request
1964), the courts held that the express release by the wife was not essential to the Davis
decision.
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1976); Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234
S.E.2d 774 (1977).
51. - S.C. -, 270 S.E.2d 623 (1980).
52. Id. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 624.
53. See generally, Annot., 89 A.L.R.2D 106 (1963). See also Jones v. Jones, 251 Ala.
179, 36 So. 2d 310 (1948); Livsey v. Livsey, 234 Ga. 53, 214 S.E.2d 520 (1975); Spivey v.
Schneider, 234 Ga. 687, 217 S.E.2d 251 (1975); Page v. Page, 219 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa
1974); Gardier v. Perry, 405 A.2d 721 (Me. 1979); Bellows v. Bellows, - R.I. -, 382
A.2d 816 (1978); Renaud v. Renaud, 118 R.I. 365, 373 A.2d 1198 (1977); Cooper v.
Cooper, 132 Vt. 619, 326 A.2d 145 (1974).
54. Brief of Appellant at 13.
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for a reduction in child support.5 6 The supreme court reversed
the lower court order on the ground that the trial judge had
committed error by considering the earnings of the second Mrs.
Bryan57 and held that her income was not relevant to the review
of Mr. Bryan's support obligation.8
The court explained that the rule in Bryan was implied by
the holding in Sanders v. Sanders59 that a wife's remarriage
alone is not ground for reduction of child support paid by the
father.60 In Sanders, a divorce decree awarded Mrs. Sanders cus-
tody of the couple's daughter and child support payments but
permitted Mr. Sanders to retain custody of their son. Following
his ex-wife's remarriage, Mr. Sanders petitioned for termination
of the child support payments for his daughter, asserting that
his ex-wife's financial situation had improved to such an extent
through her remarriage that he should be totally relieved of his
support obligation.61
The court noted that Mr. Sanders had not claimed that his
income had decreased or that he was unable to support himself
and his children but rather that his ex-wife and her second hus-
band could support his daughter on a higher level than he could
support his son. 2 The court rejected the claim and held that the
betterment of an ex-wife's financial status through remarriage
does not require modification of the support decree if "there is
no proof of assumption by the second husband of [the] obliga-
tion to support the child or children of the first marriage. ' 6s Ab-
sent this assumption by the second husband, the father's legal
obligations are unaffected by the ex-wife's remarriage, and there
is no ground for modification of the support decree.
As a general principle, the obligation of a father to support
his children is one imposed by law6 4 and cannot be nullified by
Bryan introduced evidence of his second wife's income to show that she was providing
for the support of her children. Brief of Appellant at 13.
56. Record at 8.
57. - S.C. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 624.
58. Id.
59. 230 S.C. 263, 95 S.E.2d 440 (1956).
60. Id. at 268, 95 S.E.2d at 442.
61. Brief of Appellant at 7.
62. 230 S.C. at 267, 95 S.E.2d at 442.
63. Id. at 268, 95 S.E.2d at 442-43.
64. Id. at 265, 95 S.E.2d at 441.
[Vol. 33
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the remarriage of his ex-wife65 or by his remarriage and assump-
tion of additional obligations.6 Circumstances bearing on the
ex-wife's capacity to support the children do not affect the fa-
ther's duty because his responsibilities to his children are inde-
pendent of anyone else's ability to care for them. It was this
parental obligation that the court enforced in Sanders.
Although the court relied on Sanders to reach its result in
Bryan, the cases are distinguishable. Mr. Sanders, by requesting
a reduction of child support because of his ex-wife's changed
financial circumstances, sought to relinquish a nondelegable pa-
rental duty. Mr. Bryan, however, predicated his request on his
own reduced income, seeking modification not of a parental duty
but of the amount the concededly obligated father must pay.
The father's total financial situation, which includes family in-
come generated by both the father and his second wife, should
be relevant to a review of his ability to pay child support. Sev-
eral courts have adopted this view.68 The Supreme Court of
Washington, in Hanson v. Hanson,6 9 concluded that the second
wife's income was decidedly relevant to a resolution of a child
support dispute, reasoning as follows:
The funds available to Mr. Hanson's new family unit will not
and, of course, should not as a practical matter be handled sep-
arately. In other words, the ninety dollars per month from so-
cial security will not be earmarked and expended solely for
food and the other needs of the four children of the second
Mrs. Hanson, any sums left to Mr. Hanson from his salary, af-
ter the payments to the first family, being earmarked solely for
the needs of the two adults in the new family unit and their
child. Consequently, as a practical matter, it seems obvious
that all of the funds available should be considered as a whole
in any effort to make a proper and equitable adjustment of Mr.
Hanson's income, as between his first family and his second
one.70
65. See generally, Annot., 89 A.L.R.2D 106 (1963).
66. Id.
67. 230 S.C. at 268, 95 S.E.2d at 442.
68. See note 53 supra. Other courts have accepted without comment evidence of a
second wife's financial status. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Rhodes, 7 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1928);
Williams v. Williams, 29 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
69. 47 Wash. 2d 439, 287 P.2d 879 (1955).
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The Supreme Court of Rhode Island examined this issue in Re-
naud v. Renaud71 and held that the absence of a duty on the
part of a second wife to support the children of a father's first
marriage does not render evidence of her income irrelevant:
The evidence of the second income is relevant in considering
reduction of support payments because it shows more fully the
father's ability to meet all his obligations. While there is some
authority to the contrary, we think the better rule is the more
practical and realistic one, which considers the needs and abili-
ties of all concerned parties.7 2
The rationale of these cases clearly is applicable to Bryan:
both the father and his second wife worked and presumably
pooled their funds for the benefit of the entire family.78 The
practical approach would dictate consideration of a second wife's
income when a father asserts reduced income as a basis for seek-
ing a reduction of child support payments.7' In Bryan, however,
the supreme court rejected the relevance of a second spouse's
income. In doing so, it overlooked the distinction, recognized in
Sanders, between the duty of a father to support his children
and the determination of the amount a father is able to pay and
adopted a rule that precludes the consideration of evidence that
is relevant to a fair distribution of available funds between two
families.75 A more reasonable approach might be to presume
that the total income of the father and his second family is rele-
vant, consequently placing the burden on the father to prove
that his second wife's income should not be considered.7 6 The
trial judge then would be free to evaluate the financial status of
the parties, put the contributions of the second spouse into per-
71. 118 R.L 365, 373 A.2d 1198 (1977).
72. Id. at 368, 373 A.2d at 1200 (footnotes and citations omitted).
73. Record at 30.
74. Some courts have allowed the ex-wife to receive an increase in child support
because of the father's improved financial situation subsequent to remarriage. See
Spivey v. Schneider, 234 Ga. 687, 217 S.E.2d 251 (1975); Livsey v. Livsey, 234 Ga. 53, 214
S.E.2d 520 (1975).
75. - S.C. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 623. Contrast this holding with the court's conclu-
sion in Gardner v. Perry, 405 A.2d 721 (Me. 1979), that the trial judge committed an
abuse of discretion by refusing to consider evidence of the changed financial circum-
stances attending the wife's remarriage.
76. For example, when the couple has a financial arrangement whereby each person
pays for his or her own expenses, it might be appropriate to exclude the second spouse's
income. Renaud v. Renaud, 118 R.I. 365, 373 A.2d 1198 (1977).
[Vol. 33
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spective, and fashion a support arrangement that more equitably
distributes the father's resources.
III. THE FAIRNESS TEST FOR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
In Fischl v. Fischl,7 a 1978 case, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court stated that "it is the duty of the JFamily Court]
judge to rule upon the fairness of [a property settlement agree-
ment]" in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
divorce.7 1 In two recent cases, the court has clarified the duty of
family court judges to review such agreements for fairness.
In McKinney v. McKinney,"" a wife sued for divorce on the
ground of desertion and sought custody of her children, child
support, alimony, and attorney's fees. The husband admitted
desertion, but claimed that the parties had entered into a final
property settlement agreement 0 that disposed of all issues aris-
ing out of the marital relationship, including alimony and attor-
ney's fees. The trial court agreed with the husband and, refusing
to receive the wife's evidence that the agreement did not cover
alimony and attorney's fees, ruled that the agreement was "a
true property settlement agreement [that] ordinarily may not
thereafter be modified." 81 The supreme court reversed and held
that the language of the settlement agreement was susceptible of
more than one interpretation and did not dispose of the issues of
alimony and attorney's fees.2 The court explained that, as with
any other contract, the judge must receive testimony and evi-
dence to determine the parties' intentions when the language is
ambiguous.8 Only after ambiguities are resolved may the judge
rule on the fairness of the agreement.
8 4
77. 272 S.C. 297, 251 S.E.2d 743 (1979).
78. Id. at 300, 251 S.E.2d at 745.
79. - S.C. -, 261 S.E.2d 526 (1980).
80. The property settlement is set out in full in the court's opinion. It provides,
inter alia, that "each party agrees to refrain from bothering, molesting, or compelling the
other to do anything against his or her will not herein especially set forth" and that the
agreement constituted the "final property settlement and support agreement," which
represented and contained "the full understanding of the parties." Id. at -, 261 S.E.2d
at 527-29.
81. Record at 6.
82. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 529.
83. Id. at -' 261 S.E.2d at 530.




Published by Scholar Commons, 1981
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Drawdy v. Drawdy,85 the divorce decree, which granted
the wife a divorce on the ground of adultery, incorporated a
property settlement agreement entered into by the parties. The
agreement, admittedly not reached in contemplation of a final
divorce, contained no specific provision for or waiver of alimony,
and the wife sought its repudiation. In its determination of the
agreement's fairness, the family court only considered evidence
of the agreement's valid execution and rejected testimony con-
cerning the parties' respective economic circumstances and con-
tributions.8 6 The supreme court reversed and emphasized that it
will not accept as a sufficient finding of fairness a determination
based solely on evidence that the agreement was validly
executed:
We think it incumbent upon the family court... to satisfy
itself the agreement is a fair contractual end to the parties'
marital claims. This cannot be done without examining the
agreement in light of the economic circumstances and contri-
butions of each party. In this case, evidence above and beyond
whether the agreement was validly executed ... is essential to
a determination of its fairness.
87
The court suggested that invocation of Family Court Rule 19 " is
an appropriate means by which family court judges can obtain
the financial information they need to assure that property set-
tlement agreements are fair in substance.
McKinney and Drawdy help to clarify the "fairness" test
announced without explanation by the supreme court in Fischl,
and set forth procedures that must be followed by family court
judges before a property settlement agreement can be incorpo-
rated or merged into a divorce decree. First, courts must resolve
any ambiguities by examining the facts and circumstances sur-
85. - S.C. ,- 268 S.E.2d 30 (1980).
86. Record at 4.
87. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 30.
88. S.C. CoDE ANN. FAMILY CT. R. 19 (Supp. 1980) provides:
A current financial declaration in the form prescribed by Appendix A shall
be served and filed by any petitioner or respondent appearing at any hearing at
which the Court is to determine an issue as to which such declaration would be
relevant and so much thereof shall be completed as is applicable to the issue to
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rounding the agreement. 89 Then they must rule on the fairness
of the settlement after full consideration of evidence showing
the intentions of the parties, the circumstances of the agree-
ment,9 and the financial situation of the parties.91 Even an
agreement susceptible of but one interpretation must pass the
fairness test.9 2 Thus, despite the court's characterization of the
property settlement agreement as a "contract,"93 the holdings of
McKinney and Drawdy indicate that even an agreement negoti-
ated in good faith, fully expressing the intentions of the parties,
unambiguous on its face, and duly executed can be repudiated
later if one party challenges it as unfair in substance.
The major practical effect of these two decisions is that the
parties to a validly executed property settlement cannot be as-
sured of its finality; indeed, parties to such agreements must be
prepared at the divorce hearing to confront issues that presuma-
bly were settled in advance if one spouse becomes dissatisfied
with the agreement. Furthermore, the court's concern with ali-
mony in both McKinney and Drawdy suggests that this matter
must be expressly included within the terms of the settlement
agreement before the court will find it disposed of under the
contract.
Parties to a divorce proceeding cannot assume that presen-
tation of a settlement agreement to the court and proof of its
authenticity will result in its incorporation into the divorce de-
cree. Instead, they may be required to establish, with a Rule 19
financial statement and other relevant extrinsic evidence, that
the settlement accurately reflects their financial status. Given
the uncertainty inherent in a determination based on substan-
tive "fairness," estranged spouses will have little incentive to
reach an "extrajudicial agreement" on issues that are subject to
full review during the divorce proceeding.
Tracy L. Salisbury
89. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 529.
90. Id. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 530.
91. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 30.
92. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 527.
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